Abstract-The inductive assertion method is generalized to permit formal, machine-verifiable proofs of correctness for multiprocess programs. Individual processes are represented by ordinary flowcharts, and no special synchronization mechanisms are assumed, so the method can be applied to a large class of multiprocess programs. A correctness proof can be designed together with the program by a hierarchical process of stepwise refinement, making the method practical for larger programs. The resulting proofs tend to be natural formalizations of the informal proofs that are now used.
I. INTRODUCTION
T HE prevalence of programming errors has led to an interest in proving the correctness of programs. Two types of proof have been used: formal and informal. A formal proof is one which is sufficiently detailed, and carried out in a sufficiently precise formal system, so that it can be checked by a computer. An informal proof is one which is rigorous enough to convince an intelligent, skeptical human, and is usually done in the style of "journal mathematics proofs."
The need for correctness proofs is especially great with multiprocess programs. The asynchronous execution of several processes leads to an enormous number of possible execution sequences, and makes exhaustive testing impossible. A multiprocess program which has not been proved to be correct will probably have subtle errors, resulting in occasional mysterious program failures.
We have written several multiprocess algorithms to solve synchronization problems, and have given informal proofs of their correctness. Although the proofs were simple and convincing, they were ultimately based on the method of considering all possible execution sequences. This method is not well-suited for formal proofs. Other formal methods seemed either too difficult to be practical, or else were not applicable because they were based upon special synchronization primitives.
In this paper, we present a simple generalization of Floyd's inductive assertion method [91 which seems to be practical for proving the correctness of multiprocess programs. Using it, we have been able to translate our informal correctness proofs into formal ones. We feel that it can provide the basis for a general system for proving the correctness of most types of multiprocess programs. Programs are simply represented by ordinary flowcharts, and
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no particular synchronization primitive is assumed. Any desired primitive can easily be represented. The method is practical for larger programs because the proof can be designed together with the program by a hierarchical process of stepwise refinement.
To prove the correctness of a program, one must prove two essentially different types of properties about it, which we call safety and liveness properties.1 A safety property is one which states that something will not happen. For example, the partial correctness of a single process program is a safety property. It states that if the program is started with the correct input, then it cannot stop if it does not produce'the correct output. A liveness property is one which states that something must happen. An example of a liveness property is the statement that a program will terminate if its input is correct.
The techniques used to prove safety and liveness are quite different from one another. They are therefore described in separate sections. Each of these two sections begins with an informal description of the, technique in terms of a simple example, then gives a formal exposition, and concludes with a longer example. For a short introduction, the reader can omit all but the first parts of these sections. A final section discusses some general aspects of the method, including its applicability and its relation to previous work.
II. SAFETY
The Producer/Consumer Example Before describing our formal axiom system, we illustrate the basic proof procedure with a simple example. The producer/ consumer problem has been 'used to illustrate different synchronization primitives. [5] , [101. It consists of a producer process which puts messages into a buffer and a consumer process which removes the messages. We assume that the buffer can hold at most b messages, b > 1. The processes must be synchronized so the producer does not try to put a message into the buffer if there is no room for it, and the consumer does not try to remove a message that has not yet been produced.
We will give a very simple solution which uses no complicated synchronization primitive, and might thus be more efficient than the [14] , but the correctness proof is more complicated.) By choosing k to be a multiple of b, the buffer can be implemented as an array B [0: b -I. The producer simply puts each new message into B[s mod b], and the consumer takes each message from B[rmod bl. However, proving this would complicate the proof, and it is left as an exercise for the interested reader. The only correctness property we will prove is that the producer never puts a message into a full buffer, and the consumer never takes one from an empty buffer.
We represent the, two processes with the flowcharts of Fig. 1 . For now, the reader should ignore the expressions attached to the arcs and consider only the nodes and the arcs. Note that each arc is'numbered. We have represented the operations of sending and receiving a message by incrementing the fictitious variables ms and mr, respectively. We assume that initially ms mr.
Each node of the flowchart -is assumed to represent an indivisible operation. We assume that initially a token is placed on arc I of each process. The program is executed by arbitrarily choosing one of the processes and executing one step of that process, where a step consists of moving the token through one node onto another arc and changing the values of the variables in the obvious way. For now, we allow executions which always choose to execute the same process. Such executions must be disallowed to prove liveness properties, but they do not affect safety.
For simplicity, we have represented the producer's entire Algol statement s := s+1 as a single flowchart box. We could have more faithfully represented an actual implementation by splitting it into the two assignments temp +-s + I and s +-temp. However, it is easy to see that this would make no essential difference because s is not set by the consumer. We have also represented the if statement by a single decision box. We can do this by pretending that the entire execution of the statement occurs when the value of r is read. Similar remarks apply to the consumer. Let n equal ms -mr. Then n obviously represents the number of messages in the buffer. To prove the desired safety property, we must prove that 0 < n < b holds throughout the execution of the program. We define the functions np and nc as follows. To prove the correctness of our program, we will prove that the interpretation of Fig. 1 is invariant. This is done by verifying the following two conditions: 1) the program's initial state is legitimate, and 2) if the program is in a legitimate state, then any execution step leaves it in a legitimate state. An interpretation which satisfies condition 2) is said to be consistent.
Since we start the program with each token on arc 1 and s-r = n = 0, it is easy to see that condition 1) is satisfied. The proof of condition 2) is done in two steps. First, we show that the interpretation of each process is consistent, i.e., we show that for each process: if the process' token is on an arc whose assertion is true and an execution step moves that token, then it is moved to an arc whose assertion is now true.
21t would be more precise to say that the variables and tokens are in a legitimate state, but for brevity we simply say that the program is in a legitimate state.
The proof that an interpretation of a single process is consistent is done essentially the same way as described by Floyd in [9] for a single process program. For each flowchart node, we prove that if the token is on an input arc of the node whose assertion is true, then executing the node moves the token to an output arc whose assertion is then true.
Proving the consistency of the producer's interpretation therefore requires verifying a consistency condition for each node of its flowchart. Verifying the condition for the decision box is simple, e.g., if the token is on arc 1 or 2 and nc < s-r mod k S b, then execution of the decision node moves the token to arc 3 only if s-r mod k b. This implies that nc < s-r mod k < b, so the assertion on arc 3 is then true. Verifying the consistency condition for the ms assignment node is also simple, since executing it increases nc by one and does not change s or r.
To prove the consistency condition for the s assignment node, we need the following result from number theory: if s-r mod k <k-1,then (s+1 mod k)-rmod k= (s-r mod k) + 1. Since we have assumed that b < k, this easily implies the required consistency condition.
We have thus shown that the producer's interpretation is consistent. A similar proof establishes the consistency of the consumer's interpretation. However, the consistency of each process' interpretation does not by itself imply the consistency of the entire program's interpretation. There still remains the possibility that an assertion attached to an arc was true when the process' token was moved to the arc, but was made false by the execution of the other process. The second step in proving the consistency of the interpretation is to show that this cannot happen.
Let P denote one ofthe assertions attached to the consumer's flowchart. We must show that if P is true, then it cannot be made false by executing one step of the producer. In that case, we say that P is monotone under the producer. To prove this, it suffices to show that if the producer's token is on an arc whose assertion is true, and P is true, then executing the producer's next flowchart node will leave P true. This is shown by proving the consistency of the interpretation of the producer shown in Fig. 2 , which is formed by anding P with each assertion of the producer's original interpretation. If the interpretation of Fig. 2 is consistent, then we say that P is mono- tone under the interpretation of the producer shown in Fig. 1 . The second step in proving the consistency of the program's interpretation therefore consists of proving that each assertion in the consumer's interpretation is monotone under the producer's interpretation, and vice-versa.
At this point, we urge the reader not to form any conclusion about how practical this step is for larger programs. This will be discussed later.
We now prove that each assertion P attached to the consumer's flowchart is monotone under the producer's interpretation. Instead of doing this separately for each of the three different assertions in the consumer's interpretation, we will do it all in one step by proving the monotonicity of the following assertion P for arbitrary constants u and v: 0 < (s-r mod k) +u <np + v.
To prove this, we must prove the consistency of the interpretation in Fig. 2 for this choice ofP. As before, this requires proving consistency at each flowchart node. Since we have already proved the consistency of the producer's original interpretation, we must only show that if the assertion on the input arc of the node is true, then executing the box leaves P true.
The proof of consistency at the decision box is trivial. The consistency condition for the ms assignment box follows from the observation that by the definition of np, executing this node leaves np unchanged. The consistency at the s assignment node follows from the fact that executing it increments both s-rmodkandnp by one. ,To complete the proof that the program's interpretation is consistent, we must prove that each assertion in the producer's interpretation is monotone under the consumer's interpretation. The proof is similar to the one we just did, and is left to the reader.
We now use the invariance of the program's interpretation to prove the invariance of the assertion 0 S n < b. From the producer's interpretation,_ we see that regardless of which arc the producer's token is on, we must have n, < b. Hence, the assertion n, < b is invariant. Similarly, the consumer's interpretation shows that 0 < np is invariant. Since np S n < n, by definition, the invariance of these two assertions implies that 0 < n < b is invariant. This completes our correctness proof.
The Formalism
We now formalize the method of proof used in our example. We assume some formal system for proving theorems which includes the propositional calculus. To prove correctness, it must be capable of proving useful theorems about the program's value set X. However, the details of the system will not concem us.
We let F [5] denote that f is a provable theorem in our formal system. An assertion A is considered to represent the theorem V(x, y) E XX r : A (x, y) = true. We To design a program, one designs a sequence of decompositions starting with the coarsest one and proceeding through successively finer decompositions until reaching the finest decomposition: the complete program. At each stage, one has both a decomposition and a specification of what each of its subroutine nodes is to do. To go to the next stage, one uses the specification of each node to refine it into simpler subroutine nodes. The refinement of each subroutine must only depend upon the refinement of a small number of other subroutines; otherwise the design procedure becomes too difficult.
With our method, the programmer designs his formal proof along with the program by designing an appropriate invariant interpretation. At each stage, he attaches assertions to the arcs of the decomposition. These assertions may not be fully specified, since the value set X need not be completely defined until later. In the next stage of the design, in which the programmer refines this decomposition, these assertions are more fully specified, and assertions are attached to the newly introduced arcs.
The programmer designs each refinement so that at the final stage, the interpretation of the complete program will be consistent. To show that this can be done in a hierarchical manner which makes it practical for larger programs, we will describe how the method is used in solving a more difficult problem.
The Bakery Algorithm
As our example, we will show how the solution to the mutual exclusion problem given in (131 could be constructed.
Assume that we have N processes, each with a critical section. The problem is to find an algorithm which guarantees that at most one of the processes is in its critical section at any time.
The other conditions which must be satisfied will not concern us here.
The first stage decomposition of each process is shown in Fig. 4 . Note that subroutines are denoted by boxes drawn with dashed lines. Each subroutine is numbered, and we enclose its number in a box to denote the set of all arcs of the subroutine except its entry and exit arcs. Thus, irk E [j means that process ILk is inside its critical section. We assume that initially, each process' token is in subroutine 8.
This decomposition is rather trivial. Subroutines 4 and 8 are given. Our problem is to design subroutines 2 and 6. To prove correctness, we must show that two different processes cannot both be in subroutine 4 at the same time. We will do this by proving the invariance of an interpretation containing the indicated assertions, where Dk and Ek, will be defined later. We assume that Dk is also attached to all arcs of subroutine 8, and A{Ek,:j = i,* , N} is attached to all arcs in subroutine 4 Our example showed how the program and the proof can be designed together in a top-down hierarchical fashion. At each stage, our proof required that the following conditions be satisfied by each subroutine: 1) the assertions attached to its input and output arcs are consistent, and 2) certain assertions are monotone under that subroutine. We then checked that our design was correct by showing that the informally defined subroutines satisfied these conditions. We can also regard these conditions as part of the formal specification of the subroutine. This idea can be developed into a design methodology for large programming projects, but it is beyond the scope of this paper to do so.
Observe that much of the bookkeeping in our design procedure can be automated-for example, keeping track of the monotonicity conditions. Automatic theorem provers can also do most of the work in proving the invariance of the final interpretation, since most of the consistency conditions that must be proved are very simple. However, designing the interpretation required considerable human ingenuity. Like most simple proofs, this one was hard to make simple.
Designing The correctness property is phrased in terms of sequences of events, so it cannot be directly expressed as the invariance of an assertion. The obvious method is to introduce some fictitious variables, including a "clock" which is incremented each time it is read. A process reads the "clock" at the beginning and end of subroutine 2.1, and by using the "times" read we can define an assertion whose invariance implies the desired property.
However We first generalize our definition of an interpretation to one which attaches two assertions to a single arc: an input assertion which should be true if the token is initially placed on the arc, and an output assertion which should be true if the token is b) The invariance of -Pml implies that this interpretation is consistent.
2) The consumer's token must eventually reach an arc whose output assertion is the constant assertion false.
This yields the necessary contradiction, since 1) implies that each process' token is always on an arc whose assertion is true, and 2) implies that the consumer's token must reach an arc whose assertion is false. We will use the interpretation shown in Fig. 9 , where Q denotes the assertion Pm A (n > 0) A (r1p = 4). All arcs have their input and-output assertions equal, except for arcs 1 and 4 of the consumer. Each of those arcs has the input assertion Q and the output assertion false.
It is easy to see that this interpretation satisfies condition 1 a). We next show that it satisfies 1 b). The consistency of the producer's interpretation is easy to verify. Note that the proof 135 of the consistency at the ms assignment node uses the hypothesis that 'Pm+i is invariant, i.e., the producer's token cannot reach arc 4 unless Pm+1 becomes true. To prove the consistency of the consumer's interpretation, the only nontrivial condition to verify is the one for the decision node. We first observe that the invariance of the interpretation of Fig. 1 
The Bakery Program
To illustrate the hierarchical design of a liveness proof, we return to the bakery program and its design process shown in Figs. 4-8. The basic liveness property we want to prove is that any process which reaches arc 1 of its flowchart must eventually enter its critical section. Since we have already proved that processes enter their critical sections on a first come, first served basis, we will simplify our task by proving the following property: if some process is in subroutine 2, then some process must subsequently be in its critical section.
Before doing this, we introduce some notation. Fig. 4 . Since a process in subroutine 6 might prevent any other process from entering its critical section, we want to show that all processes must eventually leave subroutine 6. To do this, we make the following definitions: (2) = {A(S): S*01} U {B(T): T*0}
B(T)<A (S) for all S, T B(T')<B(T) iff T T'. Since A(4)=V{B(T) :-T=A}, we need only prove that B(T)..0-V{B(T'): T$ T'} for all T#0 . This will require a further decomposition of B(T).
We next turn to the stage 2 decomposition of the program shown in Fig. 5 . We expect any process in subroutine 2.1 to leave that subroutine and enter subroutine 2.3. This leads us to make the following definitions. To prove these conditions, we have to tum to the final pro- Step b) is a safety property which is easily proved by the methods described before, and the other steps are easily proved using LI. By L2 and Theorem 5, they prove 2). The proof of 3) is similar to that of 2), except that it requires the additional step of proving the following trivial safety 
B(T, U)-B(T)
A
Discussion ofthe Proof
Let us consider the informal reasoning underlying the above proof.: We must assume that no process is ever in its critical section, and then derive a contradiction. We first observe that this assumption implies that all processes must leave subroutine 6 (Lemmas 1 and 2). Next, we see that we may further assume that no more processes enter subroutine 2.1, so eventually there will be no processes in that subroutine (Lemmas 3 and 4). We cannot suppose all processes will eventually reach subroutine 2, since a process may remain forever in subroutine 8. Finally, we show that if subroutines 2.1 and 6 are empty, then the process Hk with k ..<j for all j must eventually enter its critical section (Lemmas 5 and 6).
This reasoning assumes certain properties of the subroutines 2.1, 2.3, and 6: namely, the properties formalized in conditions I)-3). The proofs of these conditions were quite straightforward, and were essentially the same as the usual proofs of termination for sequential programs. Of course, the formal proofs that we sketched required a considerable amount of detail for such simple results. However, that was because we had to reduce everything to our fundamental axioms LI and L2. A few basic theorems-e.g., that a process must eventually exit from a loop-free subroutine-would greatly simplify the proofs. There is no real difficulty in constructing complete formal proofs of conditions 1)-3).
The situation is not quite as satisfactory with the rest of the proof. If we consider Lemmas 1-6 and their proofs to constitute a very rigorous informal correctness proof, then it is doubtful that this proof inspires any more confidence in the program than the simple informal reasoning upon which it was based. We can also consider our proof to be a sketch for a complete formal proof. It is certainly rigorous enough to be formalized, but it would be rather tedious to do so without help from an automated proof verifier. A general-purpose proof verifier would have to be quite sophisticated in order to provide this help.
Fortunately, a sophisticated verifier should not be necessary. Examining the proofs of the lemmas shows that they follow a similar pattern. Further experience constructing liveness proofs should enable us to ritualize the procedure. It would then be possible to design a relatively unsophisticated automated system to aid in constructing the proofs and to verify them.
Observe that we never assumed that a process which enters its critical section must eventually leave it. We very carefully formulated our liveness property so that assumption was unnecessary. Of course, the complete program would undoubtedly be considered incorrect if a process remained forever in its critical section. However, we were really only interested in proving the correctness of subroutines 2 and 6.
Real Time Considerations
We now examine the meaning of the relation in terms of program execution times. Let us assume that each process has a run time clock which is advanced by a positive quantity every time one of its nodes is executed. (This quantity may depend upon the node and the values of variables.) Let us also assume a single real time clock which is arbitrarily advanced, but must always run at least as fast as each process' run time clock. This represents our intuitive idea of how processes are actually executed by real machines.
Let us now make the further assumption that there are posi- As we have already stated, the strong form of L2 is rarely needed. Even in programs such as our bakery algorithm in which the value set X is infinite (n [k] can become arbitrarily large), we still only need the weak form of L2.
IV. FURTHER REMARKS Applicability
Our multiprocess flowchart programs are sufficiently general to allow a convenient representation of most single-site multiprocess systems.4 The only apparent lack of generality is the assumption of a fixed number of processes. However, the creation and destruction of processes can be represented by having processes leave and enter waiting loops. Since the actual number of processes need not be specified (our bakery program was proved correct for any N), this is a satisfactory approach. Another approach will be described below.
It seems possible to represent any desired correctness property as either the invariance of an assertion, or a relation of the form A B. This may require the introduction of fictitious variables.
Our formalism does not rely upon any particular form of interprocess synchronization. Indeed, we easily represented the bakery algorithm in which no a priori synchronization mechanism was assumed. This means that the programmer can choose the type of synchronization most appropriate to his problem, and is not forced to introduce unnecessary synchronizing operations in order to prove the correctness of his program. A good example of a problem that can and must be solved without costly synchronization is given in [8] .
Any desired synchronization primitive can easily be represented. For example, Fig. 11 A subroutine which can be represented as an indivisible operation may also be further decomposed. By Theorem 2, the proof of correctness of this decomposition becomes independent of the rest of the program, and is essentially the same as the correctness proof for a sequential program as described in [9] . The decomposition can be carried down to the lowest level of detail at which a process maintains its identity. This level is usually that of the individual instruction in some programming language.
When proving the correctness of a program, there are two things that must be verified which are external to our formalism:
1) The flowchart program must be a correct representation of the actual program.
2) The formal correctness properties that we prove really do imply that the program will exhibit the desired behavior.
We may view the total system as a hierarchy of virtual machines. The highest level machine is the one seen by the user; the lowest level one consists of the logical design of the hard- [3] . For now, this must be proved informally. In any case, correctness of the lowest level coupling (the correct implementation of the hardware design) and of the highest level coupling (the satisfaction of the user's desires) can never be formally proved.
An Experiment
Upon discussing our method with others, we were asked how long it takes actually to construct a correctness proof. Our experience with the above proofs did not provide an answer for two reasons: we were already quite familiar with the algorithms before we started, and we worked very hard to make the proofs as simple and elegant as possible. We therefore decided to construct correctness proofs for the solutions to the problem given by Courtois, Heymans, and Parnas in [7] . These were algorithms we had only casually read before.
We first proved the fundamental safety properties of the algorithm. We did this by writing down the appropriate interpretation, and informally checking the conditions needed to prove its invariance. (Essentially the same proof works for both of their solutions.) Starting from when we began examining the algorithms, this took about 1 3 hours. 4 We next sketched a proof of the following liveness property of their second solution: if a writer wants to write, then some writer will eventually enter its writing section. 5 The level of detail in this sketch was analogous to specifying the set of assertions (d (4) and the statements of Lemmas 1-6 and conditions l)-3) in our liveness proof for the bakery algorithm, but not writing down the proofs of the lemmas or the conditions. Starting from when we chose our informal liveness property, this took about 1-hours.
Of course, most people would take longer to construct these proofs than we did. One can expect to take at least twice as long in his first attempt at this type of formal proof. He should not even make the attempt until he is sure he could write a rigorous informal proof. However, these times do indicate what can be expected from one who is experienced at writing informal proofs and has some practice with our formal method.
Extensions to the Method
There are two ways to extend our method: by specialization and by generalization. We begin with specialization. Our formalism placed no restriction on the value set X. A useful extension would be to formally define some sort of structure on S. For example, we can assume that X is a product of the 5This requires a different defnition of the semaphore operations than the one described in Fig. 11.   140 value sets of the component variables. We could then formally define local variables. Such a structure would make it possible to give a simple formal statement of Theorem 2.
Another reason for placing a structure on X is to allow us to fork formalize the concept of a closed subroutine. This would enable one to use a library subroutine without having to prove it correct every time it is used. The specification of the subroutine would contain certain theorems which would permit a formal correctness proof for the program without having to decompose the subroutine. These theorems would be of two s k b tk * c kinds: i) safety properties stated by sufficient conditions on the assertions to guarantee the existence of a consistent interpretation of the subroutine, and ii) liveness properties stating conditions which guarantee termination. For example, the P(s) semaphore operation could be represented by a subroutine whose specification consists of the following two theorems: i) a consistent interpretation is obtained if the output join assertion is implied by the conjunction of s > 0 and the input assertion with s-1 substituted for s, and ii) if s > 0 and some process is inside a P(s) subroutine, then some process will eventually exit from a P(s) subroutine. By defining an appropriate structure on X, these ideas can be formalized.
a sk +tk Another useful specialization would be to restrict the type of flowcharts allowed. Arbitrary flowchart processes were the natural setting for describing the formalism. However, progress in structured programming has shown that they are not Fig. 12 . Representation of a b + c. the best way to think about programs. Of course, our method of designing by successive refinement is the essence of structured programming. However, it would be better to have another method of representing processes which would more translation of the Algol statement a := b + c where the fetches forcefully encourage a properly structured design, and would of b and c are not ordered. Executing the fork node places a exhibit the structure in the final program. Such a representa-token on each of its output arcs. Execution of the join node tion just requires a change of syntax, and is irrelevant to our can only take place when there is a token on each input arc, basic formalism. However, this does not diminish its impor-and it replaces these tokens by a single token on the output tance for a practical programming tool.
arc.
We now consider some possible generalizations of our forIncorporating fork and join nodes into our formalism is dismalism. First, it would be trivial to combine our two types of armingly simple. The consistency conditions for these nodes flowchart nodes into a single more general one: an assignment are simple and obvious. We need only change Definition 3 c) node having an arbitrary number of exit arcs. This would al-so that for an interpretation I to be consistent, If A (T1. = ,B) low the P(s) operation in Fig. 11 to be represented by a single must be monotone under Ik for all j, k including i = k.6 Alnode with two input and two output arcs. The necessary mod-though this seems like a minor change, it tums out to be disasification to our definitions should be obvious.
trous. It destroys the conceptual separation of the processes, Another possible generalization is to allow recursive subrou-making the design of a proof much more difficult. tines. A recursive subroutine is represented by a flowchart Fortunately, there is no problem if the fork and join nodes containing one or more nodes which represent another instance are used in a properly disciplined fashion. We can restrict of the entire subroutine. Our methods cannot prove the con-their use to the type of structure shown in Fig. 13 , in which sistency of a single interpretation of such a flowchart or a a process splits into concurrently executed subprocesses. The single --relation. However, we can use our methods com-subprocesses can in tum split into subprocesses, and so on. bined with mathematical induction to prove theorems of the This yields a hierarchical tree structure of processes and their type described above about the subroutine. Working out the subprocesses. In the definition of a consistent interpretation, details is a formidable task which we will not even contemplate an assertion attached to an arc of a process need not be monohere.
tone under the interpretation of that process or of any proProbably the most significant generalization is to allow the cesses above or below it in the tree of processes. The definition creation and destruction of processes. Equating a process with of an inevitable set (Definition 7) must also be modified. The a token (rather than a flowchart), this is easily done by defin-details are easy and are left to the reader. ing new nodes which create and destroy tokens. These nodes, called fork and join nodes, were first defined in [6] . Their 6The assertion wri = ,now means that at least one of rI's tokens is on meaning is illustrated by Fig. 12, which shows a very precise arc ,. 
Comparison with Previous Methods
There have been several methods previously proposed for proving the correctness of multiprocess programs. They can be divided into two general classes: very general formal methods, and less general, usually less formal approaches. The earlier general methods such as [2] represented the multiprocess program as a single nondeterministic sequential program. This approach is unsatisfactory because it uses a very unnatural representation. The later formal methods of Ashcroft [1] and Keller [12] permitted explicit representation of multiple processes, where a process can be identified with a movable token on a directed graph.
Our method of proving safety properties can be viewed as a special case of the methods of Ashcroft and Keller. Although this may seem to diminish the significance of our method, it is precisely its more specific nature which makes the method useful. All methods of proving safety can be viewed as special cases (where Fn denotes the composition of F with itself n times). We merely let F be the function which takes the current program state into its next state. However, its generality renders this theorem useless because it tells us very little about how to construct a proof for an actual program. By being more specific than Ashcroft and Keller, we have provided a method which gives more guidance to the programmer. We have not found the greater generality of these other methods to offer any significant advantage to compensate for their lack of guidance.
We differ considerably from Ashcroft and Keller in our method of proving liveness properties. Liveness is not considered at all by Ashcroft. Keller's concept of liveness is a weaker one than ours, and essentially states that some condition never becomes impossible. For example, it would consider a mutual exclusion condition to be suitably "live" so long as a waiting process always retained the possibility of entering its critical section-even though it might also be possible for it to wait forever. Although such a liveness property is often adequate in practice, there always lurks the possibility that some unforeseen "resonance"-phenomenon in the implementation might make a process wait much longer than seemed likely.
Other proof procedures have been proposed which are more specific than ours, and assume some type of synchronization primitive (4] , [10] , [11] , [15] . The basic reason for their assumptions is to insure that data cannot be accessed by one process while they might be modified by another process. It seems to have been generally accepted that this was necessary in order to allow a correctness proof (5, p. 241 ] . Such methods obviously cannot be used to design the lower level virtual machines-the ones which implement the synchronizing primitives. However, they can be useful for designing the higher level ones. Fortunately, these methods can all be carried out in terms of our formalism. They just require using the appropriate synchronizing primitives and process structuring techniques when designing the multiprocess flowchart programs. It seems useful to have a simple common formalism upon which to base these different methods.
After writing the initial version of this paper, we learned of the recent work of Owicki [16] , [17] . Her method of proving safety properties is very similar to ours. Apart from syntactic details, the basic difference between her method and ours is that she uses assertions which may depend only on variable values, and not on token positions. The restriction requires the use of fictitious variables in most proofs. We find it more elegant to use assertions about token positions rather than introducing extraneous variables, but that is a matter of taste. Owicki does not prove liveness properties. Instead, she proves that programs written in terms of a special await condition primitive cannot become deadlocked by having all processes waiting at the same time.
CONCLUSIONS
We have presented a method for constructing formal, machine-verifiable proofs of correctness for multiprocess programs. It allows a reasonably simple formalization of informal proofs, and is practical for proving the correctness of the short algorithms commonly published in joumals. With the type of automated aids which can now be built, the method should provide the basis for a system for designing and machineverifying large real programs. This is because the program and its proof can be designed together in a top-down, hierarchical fashion. Even without the automated aids needed to carry out the proof at the levels of greatest detail, the method provides an informal proof of the correctness of the higher level design.
Since the method does not rely upon any synchronizing primitive, it can be used for any kind of multiprocess programeven the lowest layers of an operating system. The proof procedure does not require the introduction of any unnecessary synchronization into the program.
Although the method makes correctness proofs practical, it does not make them easy. Designing proofs is still a poorly understood art. Good proofs, like good programs, cannot be produced by bad programmers. 
